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Abstract 
In this paper we model the conflict between the group of polluting firms of a country and the 
social planer of the same country which attempts to control the volume of emissions 
generated during the production process. Both players of the game have their own control 
policies which are the rate of emissions on behalf the polluting firms and the rate of pollution 
control (e.g. abatement or taxation) on behalf the home country. The common state variable 
of the model is the number of the polluting firms, which is better to minimized through the 
country’s control policy, but beneficial to maximized on the polluters’ side. From the game 
theoretic point of view the model setup is very simple and belongs in to the special class of 
differential games also called state separable differential games. An important property for 
these games is that the open-loop Nash equilibrium coincides with the Markovian (closed-
loop) equilibrium and in the case of hierarchical moves the analytical solutions are easy 
obtained. The game proposed here is analyzed for both types of equilibrium, i.e. Nash and 
Stackelberg. In the simultaneous move game (i.e. the Nash game) we find the equilibrium 
analytical expressions of the controls for both players as well as the steady state stock of the 
polluting firms. A sensitivity analysis of the crucial variables of the model takes place. In the 
hierarchical move game (i.e. the Stackelberg game) we find the equilibrium values of the 
controls as well as of the state variable. As a result a comparison between the two types of 
equilibrium for the game takes place. The analysis of the comparison reveals that the conflict 
is more intensive (since both controls have greater values) for the case in which the polluting 
firms play as the leader of the hierarchical move game. 
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1. Introduction 
The choice of the differential game models, in order to design efficiently conflicting 
situations between the polluters and the victims of pollution, is rather the rule than the 
exception. In this paper, we may use the efficiency of the differential game models to study 
the dynamic interactions of the polluting firms in a country and the social planer of the same 
country. The strength of the polluting firms as a group changes over time and it is measured 
by the volume of active polluters, the transactions made among them, by how dangerous for 
the environmental amenities are the polluting firms as a group and so on. New polluting firms 
are initiated and encouraged by the existing.  
Regarding the polluter's attrition, their decay rate is affected by their own actions and 
by the counter–pollution actions of the home country as well. The essential targets of the 
home country are to derive utility from the polluting firms’ emissions reduction, but the home 
country face substantial costs combating the polluters and suffer from disutility stemming 
from the size of the polluters. Conversely, each polluting firm wants to maximize the size of 
the group of the polluters as well as its utility stemming from the emissions.  
In this study we deal with a special class of differential games called the state–
separable game. The state–separable differential games belong into the special class of 
dynamic games which allow, in the most cases, the derivation of the Nash solutions in explicit 
form. The advantage of the analytical solutions, according to Dockner et al. (2000), is of great 
importance because the derived mathematical expressions of the solutions are crucial for the 
study of the qualitative properties of equilibrium. 
Due to the simplicity of the structure the state separable differential games are 
characterized by the linearity of the objective functional with respect to the state variable(s) 
and by no interaction between control and state variables (Dockner et al, 1985). An important 
property of the state separable games is related with the information structure employed. The 
importance of that property is that the open loop Nash solution coincides with the closed loop 
(Markovian) Nash solution. 
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Another important property hinges on the way the game played, i.e. simultaneously 
(Nash) or hierarchically (Stackelberg). As it is known (e.g. Başar and Olsder 1992, Dockner 
et al 2000), in the Stackelberg games, the adjoint variable of the leader w.r.t. the adjoint 
variable of the follower plays a crucial role at the solution process, but due to the state 
separability the interconnection between these variables vanishes. 
In the rest of the paper we determine the Nash and the Stackelberg solutions of the 
environmental differential game and the state–separability advantage allow to write down 
some useful propositions and to carry out sensitivity analyses. On the design efficient 
counter–pollution actions against the polluting firms of a country, the model parameters of the 
game and the relevance of the two solutions offers useful information as well. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we setup the basic model. Section 3 
considers the solutions of the Nash equilibrium and performs a simple sensitivity analysis. In 
section 4 we compute the analytical expressions of the open–loop Stackelberg equilibrium 
while the polluting firms leads and the social planer of home country follows. Section 5 
compares the two solution strategies, while the last section concludes the paper. 
2. The model 
In the real world scenario, it seems plausible that the mere existence of polluting 
firms (the polluters) is considered as being an intertemporal threat to any home country’s 
environmental quality. Translating into strategies, the polluting firms on one hand, have to 
decide about the volume of the emission attacks will carry out, while the home country on the 
other hand has to defend in the “war of pollution”. In the model presented here the state 
variable of the above clash is the volume of polluting firms, which denoted by x .  
Moreover, we make the assumption that the new polluting firms are supported and 
financed by the existing, thus it is reasonable to face the growth of the polluting firms as in 
the population models in the absence of controls. Analogously to the models of population a 
very simple equation that is suitable to describe the evolution of population of the polluting 
firms at time t , ( )x t , is the following differential  
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                                         ( ),        0 0x gx x= >ɺ
     
    ( )1  
where g  denotes the endogenous growth rate of the polluting firms.  
The volume of emissions realizations (denoted by υ ) reduces the number of polluting 
firms due to  the compliance costs, i.e. the more (stronger) the emissions the higher the 
penalties imposed by authorities, consequently the lower the number of the polluting firms 
that survive from the curse of compliance costs. We assume for simplicity that this fact is 
proportional to the number of emissions realizations, i.e. γυ ,  and as reduces the volume of 
the polluters, it is added as an outflow term to equation ( )1 , i.e. it is entered into ( )1  with the 
minus sign. 
Moreover, we set as the control variable of the home country the intensity u  of the 
counter–emissions effort. The greater the intensity of the counter–emissions effort, the more 
resources there are that can be devoted to investigating the implications of emissions 
realization. Moreover, the stronger the home country’s counter–pollution effort, the more 
effective is the reduction of the polluting firms. We assume that this fact is the linear term 
( )f u uβ= , and the parameter β  denotes the percentage looses per emission realization, on 
behalf the polluters, when the social planer of the home country, abates (or taxes) the 
pollutants (is counter–offensive). Again, the above term reduces the volume of the polluting 
firms, and therefore we add a second outflow term to ( )1 that weights the volume of emissions 
υ  with uβ .  
Regarding the control variable of the home country, i.e. the intensity of counter–
pollution effort, this control certainly reduces the volume of the polluters and therefore a new 
negative term is entered into the equation ( )1 . This term represents the looses due to the 
intensity of counter–measures at the initiation phase and is proportional to the control u , i.e. 
is the term uφ . Here we note that taking measures against the polluting firms’ initiation is 
very sensitive process as the planer of the home country has to discriminate among the firms. 
Since the discrimination process lurking risks (e.g. the taxation must be not a blind taxation), 
5 
 
we designate this inflow to equation ( )1 , as a quadratic, with respect to the intensity of 
pollution control measures, cost function (e.g. the square of abatement or taxation).                                          
             After all, the volume of polluting firms evolves according to the following equation:                  
                           
2
2
dx a
x gx u u u
dt
φ γυ β υ= = − + − −ɺ  
where: 
0x≥  the state variable (the volume of polluting firms) 
0u≥  the control variable of the home country i.e. the intensity of the home country’s 
counter pollution effort,  
0υ≥  emissions’ rate (control variable of the polluting firms) 
0g ≥  endogenous growth rate of the group of polluters 
0φ≥  rate at which the counter pollution measures would reduces the polluting firms  
2
0a ≥  the cost factor which faces the home country due to the unsuccessful discrimination 
among the overall firms during the abatement (or taxation). 
 0β ≥  percentage looses of the polluters per emission  
0γ ≥  average number of polluting firms which are not able to face the compliance costs. 
 In this paper, we assume that the social planer of home country wishes to minimize 
the following objectives. First, he wants to minimize the volume of emissions υ  and second 
to minimize the volume of the polluting firms x  (which is the state variable of the model). 
An important reason the social planer may wish to minimize the volume of polluters is that 
the threat of pollutants concentration is costly for the home country, because of costs 
associated with the uncertainty of business investments which in turn leads to the market 
shrinkage.  As the third objective, the home country has an interest in minimizing the 
counter–pollution effort (e.g. in lowering the environmental tax factor), by minimizing its 
control variable u . It is well known that the pollution–control activities cost money, as 
almost any control policy execution.  
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In the decision making literature, the social planning, in intertemporal formulations, 
is described as trying to minimize a weighted sum of the state x  and the opponent's control 
υ , as well as the effort cost stemming from its own control variable u . Therefore after the 
above simplified assumptions and with a positive discount rate 1ρ , the intertemporal home 
country’s minimized functional will be the following 
                                     
( )
( )1 1 2 3
.
0
min t
u
e c x c c u dtρ υ
∞
− + +∫                 ( )2  
The polluting firms as a group, on the other hand, are interested to increasing their 
number x  in order to exert more market power. The emissions’ rate υ  is their control 
variable which is maximized. But the emission realizations cost money and this cost is 
represented in the objective functional by the quadratic cost function( ) 24 2c υ . Regarding the 
polluting firms benefits with respect to the counter pollution effort, i.e. the home country's 
control variable u , the high values of that control may work as an indirect way of stirring up 
sentiments against the home's environmental policy. Therefore we represent this displeasure 
as a polluting firms' benefit  and we set in their objective functional as the weighted term bu .  
Finally, for a positive discount rate 2ρ  the intertemporal objective function of the 
polluting firm may be the following 
                          
( )
2 24
1 2 3
.
0
max
2
t ce b x b b u dtρ
υ
υ υ
∞
−   + + −   ∫                 ( )3  
with                                          i gρ >    1, 2i=                                   ( )4  
the home country minimizes functional (2) and the polluting firms maximizes (3) subject  to 
( )1  and the path constraints  
                                   ,   ,   0x u υ≥    
In the next sections we proceed with the calculation of both Nash and Stackelberg  
equilibrium solutions. 
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3. Nash equilibrium 
The Nash equilibrium computation is derived under the assumption that both players 
play the game at the same time. Then, every player of the game (i.e. the home country and the 
polluting firms) has to solve their own optimal control problem, taking the opponent's 
reaction as given. Finally, the two optimal control solutions determine the game optimal 
controls 
* *,  u υ . In the following we denote by λ  and µ  the shadow prices of the state 
variable x  for the home country and the polluters respectively. Now the current value 
Hamiltonians of the game described above are given by 
              
2
1 1 2 3
2
a
H c x c c u gx u u uυ λ φ γυ β υ
 =− − − + − + − −   
          ( )5  
     
24
2 1 2 3
2 2
c a
H b x b b u gx u u uυ υ µ φ γυ β υ
     = + − + + − + − −      
    ( )6
 
 
Proposition 1 
Along the optimal path, the shadow price of the home country's state variable is always 
negative, since one additional polluting firm is always harmful for the home country’s 
environmental quality. Conversely, since one more polluting firm increases the benefits of the 
group of polluters, the shadow price of the state variable of the polluters is positive along the 
optimal path. 
 
Proof 
The result is obtained through the Pontryagin’s maximum principle optimality 
conditions, i.e., 
                                       ( )1 1g cλ ρ λ= − +ɺ                               ( )7  
with the equilibrium   0λ=ɺ ⇒  1
1
ˆ 0
c
g
λ
ρ
=− <
−
                      ( )8a  
and the polluting firms’ shadow price evolves according to the following equation 
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                            ( )2 1g bµ ρ µ= − −ɺ  
with equilibrium                     1
2
ˆ 0
b
g
µ
ρ
= >
−
                            
( )8b  
According to ( )8a  the long–run damage to the home country, implied by having one more 
polluting firm (λˆ ), increases. This is the result of an increasing cost associated with the 
existence of a polluting firm (i.e. the factor 1c  in the home country's objective functional). 
Note that according to basic theorems of the optimal control theory the transversality 
conditions hold for all admissible state trajectories (e.g. Grass et al, 2008). 
For the following analysis presented here it is assumed that only interior solutions 
exist and they are positive, i.e. ,   0u υ> . According to Pontryagin's maximum principle, the 
maximizing condition of the Hamiltonian for the intensity of the home country’s pollution–
control effort (the home country's control variable) is given by 
     1 30      0      
H
c au
u
λφ λβυ λ
∂
= ⇔ − + − + = ⇔
∂
  
* 31 cu
a
γ βυ
λ
 = + +   
   ( )9  
The result ( )9  is recorded in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2 
The optimal counter–pollution effort 
*u  increases with: 
 a) a rising volume of emissions,  
b) an increasing percentage lost of polluting firms per emissions ( )β ,  
c) an increasing rate at which pollution–control reduce the polluting firms ( )γ .  
The cost factor which faces the home country due to the unsuccessful discrimination among 
the firms of the country during the exercise of the counter pollution measures ( )2a  has a 
decreasing influence on the home country’s intensity of conducting the above effort. 
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Looking at the control variable analytical expression ( )9 , it is worth noting that if the 
cost of control ( 3c ) is large relative the home's shadow price λ  (which is negative along the 
optimal path), the home country's optimal control 
*u  becomes low and possibly meets  the 
boundary at 
* 0u = . Conversely, if the cost of the control is negligible with respect to the 
shadow price λ , the home's optimal control collapses into a linear function of emissions υ , 
since the term 3c λ  in ( )9  vanishes. Therefore it is optimal, in the former case, for the home 
country to not exert any counter–pollution control. 
Turning in the polluters' problem and regarding their emissions, the Hamiltonian 
maximizing condition is determined by 
  ( )2 2 40          0     
H
b c υ µ γ βυ
υ
∂
= ⇔ − − − = ⇔
∂    
( )* 2
4 4
b
u
c c
µ
υ γ β= − +         ( )10  
We record the result ( )10 , as 
Proposition 3 
The optimal rate of the polluters’ emissions 
*υ decreases with:  
a) an increasing average number of the polluting firms abandonment ( )γ ,  
b) an increasing percentage looses per emission ( )uβ , and  
c) an increasing state's variable shadow price µ  of the group of polluters.  
 
According to ( )10  if the shadow price of the polluting firms is raised, then it is optimal for 
the polluters to curb the emissions' rate. Conversely, along the polluters' optimal path, the rate 
of emissions increases as the emissions' benefits( )2b  increases relative to the costs( )4c . 
A useful corollary according to the optimality conditions (9) and (10) it must be the 
following: "Along the home country's optimal path the intensity of pollution–control 
measures raises while the rate of emissions increases, and the rate of emissions declines while 
the intensity of the counter-pollution measures is increasing". 
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The stationary values of the controls in the Nash equilibrium are the following 
                                       
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 4 3
2
4
2 3
2
4
ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
N
N
b c c
u
c a
a b c
c a
β µγ φ λ
µβ
µγ µβ φ λ
υ
µβ
− + +
=
+
− − +
=
+
                     ( )11  
with ˆ ˆ,   λ µ  given by ( )8a  and ( )8b , where N in ( )11  means the Nash solution. The Nash 
equilibrium value for the polluting firms is given by 
                                  ( )1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2
N N N N N
a
x u u u
g
φ γ β υ
   = − + +    
              ( )12  
and ˆ ˆ,  N Nu υ  as in ( )11 . 
Here it is worth noting the advantage regarding the structure of the state separable 
games, due to which we have the opportunity to find the analytical expressions of the controls 
as well as of the state variable. The solution ( )11  is a unique closed loop Nash equilibrium.   
This advantage is rather unusual, since the multiple solutions in differential games is the rule. 
Due the analytical expressions ( )11   and ( )12  it is easy to proceed with sensitivity analysis 
with respect to the model parameters.   
Table 1 represents the results of sensitivity analysis. Taking the partial derivatives 
( ) ( ). parameter   ∂ ∂ , the symbol “+” means that the partial derivative is greater than zero, 
the symbol “–“ means the opposite case, 0 indicates  that the result of the partial derivative is 
zero (the parameter is not a part of the control), and ? denotes that the result is unknown. The 
results in Table 1 make some economic sense. Taking into account (8b) the polluters' shadow 
price µˆ  decreases with the discount factor 2ρ , but increases with the factor 1   b and with the 
endogenous growth rate   g .Taking into account (11) the stationary value of the polluting 
firms ˆNx  decreases with increasing endogenous rate g  (as the control factor 3c  is equal to 
zero).  
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Table 1: A summary of the sensitivity analysis results 
 φ  α  β  γ  
1c  2c  1b  2b  4c  1ρ  2ρ  
ˆ
Nu  + – ? - 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 
ˆ
Nυ  - ? ? 0 0 0 0 + + 0 0 
ˆ
Nx  + - + + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
4.   The Leader–Follower game (polluting firms as a leader) 
In the Nash equilibrium solution, as illustrated above, it is assumed that the two 
player game played simultaneously. i.e. the moves of the rivals are made at the same time. As 
it is mentioned  above, in this paper we explore and the other class of games in which one 
player, the leader, moves first, and the opponent, the follower, makes his/her decision at the 
second time. As it is known, this hierarchical or sequential mode of playing the game is the 
leader–follower or Stackelberg mode. In the game theoretic literature, e.g. Olsder and Başar, 
1999, it has been developed at least one stepwise procedure to derive the equilibrium solution. 
In order to describe (for completeness) the solution procedure we assume, without any loos of 
generality, that the first player is the leader and the second is the follower. The control and 
adjoint variables of the leader are denoted with ,   u λ  respectively, and with ,   υ µ  we denote 
the same variables for the follower. We assume moreover that the cost of pollution control 
vanishes, i.e. 3 0c = . 
The three step procedure for the (open–loop) Stackelberg solution (e.g. Grass et al, 
2008, Dockner et al., 2000, Basar T., Olsder G.,1999): 
Step 1:  The polluting firms, as group, announce their common strategy, υ  
Step 2:  For the given strategyυ , the home country (the follower) solves the same Nash 
optimal control problem. As it is mentioned in the Nash case (see ( )9 ), the home’s optimal 
response to the polluters’ strategy υ , will be               
                                ( ) ( )* * 1u u
a
υ γ βυ= = +           ( )13  
since it is assumed  that 3 0c = . 
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the adjoint λ  variable for the follower is given by equation ( )7 . 
Step 3: Now, in the last step, the leader has to solve the same as in the Nash case optimal 
control problem, but for the known reaction function ( )13 of the follower: 
                           
( )
( )2 *41 2 3
.
0
max
2
t ce b x b b u dtρ
υ
υ υ υ
∞
−
    + − +      ∫  
subject to the following state equations 
                        ( ) ( ) ( )* * *
2
a
x gx u u uφ υ υ γυ β υ υ
 = − − − −  
ɺ           ( )14  
                                               ( )1 1g cλ ρ λ= − +ɺ                              ( )15  
with ( )*u υ  given by ( )13 . 
The Hamiltonian of player 2 (the follower) becomes 
                      ( )*42 1 2 3
2
c
H b x b b u xυ υ υ µ ψλ
 = + − + + +  
ɺɺ              ( )16  
The adjoint variables are the shadow values of the states ,  x λ  for which the equations of 
motion are given by ( )14  and ( )15  respectively. Taking the first order condition for the 
Hamiltonian ( )16 , i.e., 2 0H υ∂ ∂ =  we found the optimal strategy *υ . The calculations of 
the stationary strategies are made through the substitutions in ( )13  the player’s 2 optimal 
strategy. After the rearrangement the final expressions are: 
                      
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2 4 3
2
4
2 3
2
4
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
S
S
b c b a
u
c a
a b b
c a
β µγ φ β
µβ
µγ β µφ
υ
µβ
− + +
=
+
− − −
=
+
                   ( )17       
with S to denote the Stackelberg strategy. The number of polluting firms is given by 
                         ( )1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2
S S S S S
a
x u u u
g
φ γ β υ
    = − + +     
             ( )18  
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and the optimal controls are given by ( )17 . Since the analytical expressions of the optimal 
strategies are computed for both types of the game, in the next section we compare these 
values. 
Note that, In the reverse case at which the home country moves first as a leader and 
the polluting firms follow the following controls are optimal
1
 
                         
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2
2 2
4
ˆ2 4
, 2
4
ˆ
ˆˆ2 3
, 2
4
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ2
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ2
c
S L
b c
c
S F
b c
u
c a
b a a b
c a
λ
β µ
µ λ
β µγ φ βµ γ
β µ
µ γ βφ β
υ
β µ
− + − +
=
+
− + + + +
=
+
 
 
5.  Comparison of the two solutions 
Taking the Nash solutions ( )11  and the Stackelberg solutions ( )17  the optimal 
controls can be expressed as 
                                  ˆ ˆS Nu u
a
β
= + ∆  
              ˆ ˆS Nυ υ= +∆  
while                                   3
2
4
0
ˆ
b
c a
β
β µ
∆= >
+
           ( )19  
 
the difference between the optimal stationary strategies is given by ( )19 . Some remarks can 
be drawn about the difference of the two solutions of the same game. These observations 
could be:  
i) The fewer the polluting firms losses per emission ( )β , the smaller the difference ∆ . If the 
losses rate β  vanishes ( )0β= , the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium solutions become 
equal.   
                                                          
1
 The analysis of the latter Stackelberg equilibrium case is left for future research. 
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ii) if the polluting firms have no objective which is related with the unsuccessful 
discrimination on behalf the social planer ( 3 0b = ), the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium 
solutions are equal. If the same factor 3b  is positive, the group of polluting firms announces a 
volume of emissions, Sυ , such that the home country reacts with a higher of counter–
pollution effort, Su . As a result the number of polluting firms x  increases which in turn 
increase the volume of emissions.  
As follows from the comparison of  ( )11  and ( )17   
                                  ˆ ˆS Nu u>     and     ˆ ˆS Nυ υ>  
the conflict will be more intensive if the group of polluting firms has the first mover 
advantage and announces the volume of emissions to be carried out (compared to the 
simultaneous move game). Consequently, the next result becomes obvious. 
 
Proposition 4 
The pollution control hierarchical game in which the group of polluting firms being the 
leader and the home country the follower, gives a higher volume of emissions and a more 
intensive counter–pollution effort, i.e. the conflict between the players is more intensive. 
 
The difference between the equilibrium values ( )12  and ( )18  is positive, that is 
ˆ ˆ 0S ND x x= − > , and therefore we can conclude that the polluting firms being the leader 
verifies its better position due to the increaseD  in its size. 
The linear state equations ( )12  and ( )18  can explicitly solved with respect to the 
state ( )x t , yielding: 
                                       ( ) ( )0 ˆ 1gt gtN N Nx t x e x e= + −  
                                        ( ) ( )0 ˆ 1gt gtS S Sx t x e x e= + −  
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And the value functions for the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium is easy computed as: 
                            
( )
2 24
2, 1 2 3
0
2
2 0 2 4 3
1
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 2
2
t
N N N N
N N N N N
c
V e b x b b u dt
x gx b c b u
b
g
ρ υ υ
ρ υ υ
ρ ρ ρ
∞
−  = + + − =  
− − +
= +
−
∫
 
and  
                           
( )
2 24
2, 1 2 3
0
2
2 0 2 4 3
1
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 2
2
t
S S N S
S S S S S
c
V e b x b b u dt
x gx b c b u
b
g
ρ υ υ
ρ υ υ
ρ ρ ρ
∞
−  = + + − =  
− − +
= +
−
∫
 
Moreover, the difference of the two value functions 
                             
3
2, 2,
2
0
2
S N
b
V V
a
β
ρ
∆
− = >
 
is positive, and therefore becomes better for the group of the pollutin firms to lead playing the 
Stackelberg strategy than playing the Nash strategy. This result is recorded as Proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5. 
In the environmental pollution game between the polluting firms of a country and the social 
planer of the same country the more beneficial strategy, on behalf of  the polluters, is the 
strategy in which they lead (and the home country follows) in a Stackelberg setting. 
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6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we setup a differential game model between the polluting firms of a 
country and the social planer of the same country. The model belongs into the special 
tractable class of the state separable games. This class of games has the special feature, in the 
Nash equilibrium, for which the open-loop equilibrium coincides with the closed-loop 
(Markovian) equilibrium. During the solution process, of the simultaneous move game, we 
found the analytical expressions of both players’ controls as well as the steady state of the 
stock variable (which is the volume of the polluting firms). A sensitivity analysis, which is an 
analysis between the controls and the crucial variables of the model, makes economic sense.  
Moreover a number of propositions are stated from the same Nash equilibrium game. 
As an extension of the model, we setup the game in the case of hierarchical move, i.e. we 
transform the Nash game into a Stackelberg game. With the above transformation the 
computed equilibrium values become different. The analysis of the control values 
comparison, for both equilibrium concepts, reveals that the conflict between the players of the 
game becomes more intensive in the case of the Stackelberg game. Moreover we found, 
comparing the payoffs of the polluting firms for both equilibrium concepts, that is better to 
play as leaders in a Stackelberg game. Finally, some results, recorded as propositions, are 
stated as well as in the case of the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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